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WORDS SPEAK LOUDER THAN ACTIONS: NINTH CIRCUIT
NARROWS EXCEPTION TO PLAIN MEANING
INTERPRETATION OF SIP'S
Safe Airfor Everyone v. EPA'
I. INTRODUCTION
The balance between traditional agricultural practices and
protection of the environment has led to a heated debate in the
northwestern states. The federal government has an interest in ensuring
that state environmental policies regulate agricultural practices, but the
Clean Air Act ("CAA") still grants substantial amounts of discretion to the
states to comply with federal standards. The government relies upon each
state to implement policies that address diverse local concerns. This note
explores the consequences of allowing states to participate in the creation
of federal regulations under this act, and comments on one court's
approach to resolve the inherent problems that arise out of this unusual
regulatory process.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The instant case involves the agricultural practice of open field
burning for purposes of economically and efficiently removing stubble
remaining from crop harvesting. 2 The practice of field burning is
particularly common in rural areas of northwest Idaho, because farmers
assert that the process also "improves the productivity of their fields and
has certain environmental benefits." 3 Evidence has shown that the benefits
' 475 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter SAFE].
2 Brief of Respondent at 1, Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 475 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2007)
(No. 05-75269), 2006 WL 2351247. The process has also been shown to effectively and
efficiently control insects and pests. Id. at 2.
3 Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 475 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2007). The opinion points
out that the Idaho legislature has expressed agreement with the view of most farmers in
the region. See Idaho Code Ann. § 22-4801 (2006) ("The legislature finds that the
current knowledge and technology support the practice of burning crop residue to control
disease, weeds, pests, and to enhance crop rotations . .. The legislature finds that due to
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include: (1) extending "the productive life of bluegrass fields," (2)
restoring "beneficial minerals and fertilizers to bluegrass fields," (3)
reducing or eliminating "insects on bluegrass fields," and (4) maximizing
"the soil's sunlight absorption to increase the crop yield for the following
crop." Of course, these benefits do not come without a price as asserted
by environmental groups opposing such practices.5 Field burning has been
shown to be "a source of particulate matter that contributes to air
pollution" with the effect of large clouds looming over portions of the
region and negative health consequences, which force residents with
respiratory problems to abandon their homes simply to avoid the smoke.6
The instant court also noted, "a coroner's report linked at least one fatality
to field burning."7 Moreover, the EPA has also concluded that, based on
scientific studies and resident complaints, field burning in the Northwest
raises substantial environmental and health concerns.8 These two
perspectives of agricultural field burning essentially represent opposing
sides on a very controversial issue in the northwestern states;9 therefore,
one can imagine the strong influence of policy concerns behind this
decision, which mostly turns on regulatory interpretation.
The dispute arose when the respondent, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") approved Idaho's 2005
amendment to its State Implementation Plan ("SIP").'o A SIP is a system
implemented by the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), "whereby states submit,
climate, soils, and crop rotations unique to north Idaho counties, crop residue burning is a
prevalent agricultural practice and that there is an environmental benefit to protecting
water quality from the growing of certain crops in environmentally sensitive areas").
4 Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2004).
s See http://www.safeairforeveryone.com.
6 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1100.
id.
EPA, Agricultural Burning: EPA Makes Northwest Field Burning a Top Priority 2
(November 2000), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/rl0/AIRPAGE.NSF/webpage/Agricultural+Burning (follow
"EPA Makes Northwest Field Burning a Top Priority" hyperlink) ("Even though
agricultural burning can have serious environmental and health effects, the emissions
from this practice rarely exceed federal air quality standards which limits EPA's ability to
take action.")
9 Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 1-2.
10 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1103.
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subject to the [EPA's] review and approval, proposed methods for
maintaining air quality."1' Idaho first submitted a SIP in 1972, when all
states were required to submit a SIP to the EPA within 13 months of the
passage of the CAA in 1970.12 In the 1972 SIP, a provision representing
Idaho's regulation of open burning was included that essentially outlined
the types of burning that are permitted within the state.' 3 Land clearing
burning was specifically included among the permitted types subject to
regulations in place to minimize air pollution.14 Ten years later, Idaho
submitted amendments to incorporate Idaho's recodification of air
pollution regulations, but the 1982 amendment was merely a renumbering
that maintained all of the provisions from 1972, including permissive field
burning.' 5 In 1991, the Idaho government changed its air pollution
regulations substantially, and in 1993, the EPA approved its subsequent
" Id. at 1099. "The CAA "authorizes the creation of air quality standards for a number of
pollutants, including particulate matter produced as a byproduct of burning." Id. at 1098-
99.
Each State shall, after reasonable notice and public hearings, adopt and submit
to the Administrator, within 3 years (or such shorter period as the Administrator
may prescribe) after the promulgation of a national primary ambient air quality
standard (or any revision thereof) under section 7409 of this title for any air
pollutant, a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and
enforcement of such primary standard in each air quality control region (or
portion thereof) within such State. In addition, such State shall adopt and
submit to the Administrator (either as a part of a plan submitted under the
preceding sentence or separately) within 3 years (or such shorter period as the
Administrator may prescribe) after the promulgation of a national ambient air
quality secondary standard (or revision thereof), a plan which provides for
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such secondary standard in
each air quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State. Unless a
separate public hearing is provided, each State shall consider its plan
implementing such secondary standard at the hearing required by the first
sentence of this paragraph.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000).
12 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1101.
14 Id. "The open burning of plant life grown on the premises in the course of any
agricultural, forestry, or land clearing operation may be permitted when it can be shown
the such burning is necessary and that no fire or traffic hazard will occur." Id. (citing
Section 3(H) of Idaho's Air Pollution Rules; ER 486-487).
" Id. at n.2.
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amendment to the SIP to reflect those changes.' 6 "Consequently, both
Idaho's Air Pollution Rules and the EPA-approved SIP were [ ] silent
regarding the specific practice of agricultural burning or crop residue
disposal burning."l 7 Finally, in 2005, the EPA approved the amendment in
question and incorporated the portion of the Idaho Administrative Code
that authorizes the practice of field burning.'s The court noted that Idaho
had statutes dealing with the limited permission to practice field burning
since 1985; however, the 2005 amendment to the SIP was the first time
those statutes had been referenced in the SIP.' 9 The issue brought before
the court was whether the EPA violated the CAA in approving an
amendment to the SIP that "clarified that the open burning of crop residue
was an otherwise allowable form of open burning." 20
The petitioner organization, Safe Air for Everyone ("SAFE"), was
formed in 2001 as a coalition made up of citizens and community leaders
to "protect the health of area citizens by ending grass field burning in
North Idaho." 21 SAFE challenged the approval of the SIP amendment,
because the change effectively authorized field burning and contravened
provisions in the CAA.22 Two particular sections in the CAA essentially
require that EPA approvals of a clarification or amendment of a SIP must
not weaken the prior SIP. 23 Therefore, as SAFE argues, the 2005
16 Id. at 1101.
17 Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 14-15. Another amendment occurred in 2003
took place, but "[t]he substantive language of the incorporated provisions on open
burning was identical to the language approved in the 1993 SIP." SAFE, 475 F.3d at
1102.
8 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1102. "The relevant provision, incorporating section 58.01.01.617
of the Idaho Administrative Code in effect on March 21, 2003, states: 'the open burning
of crop residue on fields where the crops were grown is an allowable form of open
burning if conducted in accordance with the Smoke Management and Crop Residue
Disposal Act and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto."' Id.
19 Id.
20 Brief of Intervenor at 1, Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 475 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2007)
(No. 05-75269), 2006 WL 2967585.
21 http://www.safeairforeveryone.com/index.php?id=about.
22 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1099.
23 Id at 1109. The sections of the CAA in pertinent part read as follows: The EPA "shall
not approve a revision of a [SIP] if the revision would interfere with any applicable
requirement concerning attainment and reasonable further progress... or any other
applicable requirement of this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(1). "No control requirement in
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amendment made field burning in Idaho legal, when under federal law,24
field burning had been illegal since the 1993 amendment to the SIP. 2 5 The
EPA, on the other hand, argued that following the plain meaning of the
SIP would be contrary to the true intent of Idaho's policy makers to permit
field burning.26 Moreover, the agency suggested that the amendment
merely clarified that which state law had already established, rather than
permitting an activity that causes air pollution that once was allegedly
prohibited.27
SAFE filed its petition for review on September 9, 2005 in the
Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals to determine if the EPA acted
reasonably in approving Idaho's SIP revision, or if the court should vacate
the EPA decision.28 The court considered the two arguments put forth by
the parties, and on January 30, 2007, the court concluded that the EPA's
approval of the SIP amendment was erroneous. 29 The court granted the
petition for review and remanded the issue to the "EPA for its
consideration of Idaho's proposed amendment as a change in the
effect, or required to be adopted by an order, settlement agreement, or plan in effect
before November 15, 1990, in any area which is a nonattainment area for any air
pollutant may be modified after November 15, 1990, in any manner unless the
modification insures equivalent or greater emission reductions of such air pollutant." Id.
§ 7515.
24 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1099. "Once approved by the EPA, [SIP's] have the force and
effect of federal law." Id. (citing Trs. For Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1210 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1994).
25 Reply Brief of Petitioners at 4, Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 475 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.
2007) (No. 05-75269), 2006 WL 3023222.
26 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1107.
27 Id. at 1109.
28 Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 1. The court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 7607, which reads in pertinent part:
A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating
any implementation plan under section 7410 of this title.. .or any other final
action of the Administrator under this chapter (including any denial or
disapproval by the Administrator under subchapter I of this chapter) which is
locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the appropriate circuit.
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000).29 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1109.
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preexisting SIP, rather than as simply a clarification of it."30 The court
based this conclusion on the point that the EPA should not have found
"that the preexisting SIP did not ban field burning," because the plain
language of the SIP revealed otherwise. 3' Since this premise was essential
to the EPA's conclusion that it did not violate the requirements of the
CAA, that conclusion was "arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 32 Therefore, the court held under the CAA, when a
SIP is amended and submitted for approval to the EPA, the agency must
review and interpret the amendment based on its plain meaning in
reference to the plain meaning of prior SIP's to ensure that the CAA is not
violated.33
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Air Act
In 1963, Congress passed the CAA with the purpose to protect and
improve air quality, advance research and development to further prevent
and control air pollution in the future, support local government programs
designed to prevent and control air pollution, and help facilitate the
development of programs preventing and controlling air pollution
regionally. 34 The CAA designates two distinct approaches for achieving
'
0 Id. at 1109-10.
31 Id. at 1109.32 id
33 id.
3' 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2000). Congress made this declaration after stating the following
findings:
(1) that the predominant part of the Nation's population is located in its rapidly
expanding metropolitan and other urban areas, which generally cross the
boundary lines of local jurisdictions and often extend into two or more States;
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about
by urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor
vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare,
including injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the
deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground transportation; (3) that
air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any
measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air
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these particular purposes: (1) requiring all states to keep concentrations of
pollutants in the air at levels prescribed by national standards; and (2)
requiring the Administrator of the EPA to identify particular stationary
sources that are likely to endanger the public heath or welfare. 3
This note focuses on the shifts of responsibility of air quality
control to state and local governments within regions designated by the
36EPA. To implement this approach, the CAA requires each state to
submit a SIP, which specifies how each particular state or region will
achieve primary and secondary air quality standards required by the act.37
Primary standards are those related to public health while secondary
standards are those that are necessary to protect the public welfare as
determined by the Administrator of the EPA.38 Collectively, these
standards are referred to as the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
and are proposed and published by the Administrator for any air pollutant
for which quality criteria are issued under 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments; and (4) that Federal financial assistance and leadership is essential
for the development of cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local programs
to prevent and control air pollution.
Id. The predecessor to the CAA and the "first legislative act to address the issue of air
pollution was the passage of the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955." Erin C. Bartley,
Creative Statutory Interpretation: How the EPA Escaped Regulation of Motor Vehicle
Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 13 Mo. ENvTL. & POL'Y REv. 136, 140 (2005).
3 11 Fed. Proc. § 32:201. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410-7411 (2000).
3 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (2000). "To assure that such air quality standards are met, the
CAA establishes a system heavily dependant upon state participation." SAFE, 475 F.3d
at 1100. The act also requires the Administrator of the EPA to "encourage cooperative
activities by the States and local governments for the prevention and control of air
pollution." 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2000).
' 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (2000). "Each State shall have the primary responsibility for
assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State by submitting
an implementation plan for such State which will specify the manner in which national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained
within each air quality control region in such State." Id.
3842 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2000).
* 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (2000).
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In creating and drafting the details of a SIP, the CAA grants states
a significant amount of flexibility.40 However, to reach the minimum level
requirements of the CAA, each SIP must include several statutory
elements before submission to the EPA. 4 1 The required element at issue in
the present case is "the mandate that state plans provide for regular
revisions to reflect evolving air quality conditions and standards."42 The
EPA treats revisions just like a new SIP with regard to the fact that they
must be open to public hearing and comment and subsequently submitted
to the EPA for approval.43 Specifically, "[t]he State must submit with the
plan, revision, or schedule a certification that" a hearing was held in
accordance with notice as required by EPA regulations.44 A state does not
4 0 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1100. "Congress intended that the states and the EPA be given
flexibility in designing and implementing SIPs." See H.R.Rep.No. 95-294, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in (1977) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1077, 1290-92. Citizens
Against Refinery's Effects, Inc. v. EPA, 643 F.2d 183, 186 (4th Cir. 1981).
41 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (2000). In summary, a SIP must include:
enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, means, or
techniques (including economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and
auctions of emissions rights), as well as schedules and timetables for
compliance, as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable
requirements of this Act.
Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (2000).
42 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H). Each plan submitted by a state to the EPA shall
provide for revision of such plan--
(i) from time to time as may be necessary to take account of revisions of such
national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard or the availability of
improved or more expeditious methods of attaining such standard, and
(ii) except as provided in paragraph (3)(C), whenever the Administrator finds on
the basis of information available to the Administrator that the plan is
substantially inadequate to attain the national ambient air quality standard which
it implements or to otherwise comply with any additional requirements
established under this chapter;
Id.
43 Sierra Club v. Ga. Power Co., 443 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006). "The SIP can be
modified only through the SIP revision process." Sierra Club v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 430 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 52.1384 (2006)).
"40 C.F.R. § 51.102(f.
Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c) of this section, States must
conduct one or more public hearings on the following prior to adoption and
submission to EPA of: (1) Any plan or revision of it required by § 51.104(a).
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need to submit revisions to a SIP to the EPA as a full reconstruction of the
plan, meeting all the formal requirements of the act for approval or
disapproval of the whole plan.45 Instead, the CAA "provides for piecemeal
submission of SIP revisions," 46 while "leaving most of the plan
untouched." 47 Once a revision to a SIP has been successfully submitted to
the EPA, the Administrator is required to approve the submission as long
it meets all the requirements of the CAA.4  However, the Act forbids the
Administrator from approving the revision if it "interfere[s] with any
applicable requirement concerning attainment and reasonable further
progress, or any other applicable requirement of this chapter." 49 Also, the
general savings clause of the CAA requires that no plan in effect before
(2) Any individual compliance schedule under (§ 51.260). (3) Any revision
under § 51.104(d).
40 C.F.R § 51.102(a) (emphasis added).
Any hearing required by paragraph (a) of this section will be held only after
reasonable notice, which will be considered to include, at least 30 days prior to
the date of such hearing(s): (1) Notice given to the public by prominent
advertisement in the area affected announcing the date(s), time(s), and place(s)
of such hearing(s); (2) Availability of each proposed plan or revision for public
inspection in at least one location in each region to which it will apply, and the
availability of each compliance schedule for public inspection in at least one
location in the region in which the affected source is located; (3) Notification to
the Administrator (through the appropriate Regional Office); (4) Notification to
each local air pollution control agency which will be significantly impacted by
such plan, schedule or revision; (5) In the case of an interstate region,
notification to any other States included, in whole or in part, in the regions
which are significantly impacted by such plan or schedule or revision.
40 C.F.R. § 51.102(d) (emphasis added).
4 Hall v. EPA, 273 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001).
46 d.
47 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1100.
48 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3) (2000).
49 42 U.S.C. § 7410(1) (2000). "The term 'reasonable further progress' means such
annual incremental reductions in emissions of the relevant air pollutant as are required by
this part or may reasonably be required by the Administrator for the purpose of ensuring
attainment of the applicable national ambient air quality standard by the applicable date."
42 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (2000).
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November 15, 1990, in a nonattainment area, may be modified "unless the
modification insures equivalent or greater emission reductions."50
B. Plain Language of a SIP
A SIP is interpreted based upon the plain language of the plan, and
if that language is clear, the court does not give any deference to agency
51interpretation. Public policy mandates that the EPA, as an agency,
cannot "interpret a regulation contrary to its unambiguous meaning"
because the "agency must adhere to its own rules and regulations." 52 In
addition to the restrictions placed on the EPA, "[a] state's 'interpretation of
its SIP cannot change the act's mandate of continuous compliance."53 The
primary reasoning behind the rule is that once the Administrator of the
EPA approves the plan, it has the force and effect of federal law to
advance a strict level of environmental standards across the nation.54 To
enforce the plan and ensure the states meet the EPA's standards, the EPA
Administrator may file suit in federal court, states may take action in
individual state courts, and citizens may seek remedies in limited
circumstances pursuant to the CAA.ss Thus, no state or agency has the
power to alter the meaning or construe the plain language of the federally
s0 42 U.S.C. § 7515 (2000). "The term 'nonattainment area' means, for any air pollutant,
an area which is designated 'nonattainment' with respect to that pollutant within the
meaning of section 7407(d) of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (2000). An area
designated as "nonattainment" is "any area that does not meet (or that contributes to
ambient air quality in a nearby area that does not meet) the national primary or secondary
ambient air quality standard for the pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
51 Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Co., 366 F.3d 692, 703 (9th
Cir. 2004). "[T]he plain meaning of a regulation governs and deference to an agency's
interpretation of its regulation is warranted only when the regulation's language is
ambiguous." Wards Cove Packing Corp. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Service, 307 F.3d
1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 2002).
52 Riverkeeper, Inc. v. E.P.A., No. 04-6692, 2007 WL 184658, *24 (2d Cir. Jan. 25,
2007) (citing Reuters Ltd. v. F.C.C., 781 F.2d 946, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
5 Sierra Club v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 430 F.3d at 1348.
54 Espinosa v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 32 F.3d 491, 492 (10th Cir. 1994).
5 Union Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 515 F.2d 206, 211 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd427 U.S. 246
(1976).
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implemented regulation under the CAA without revision and approval of
the EPA.56
Regulations are not construed based on plain language, however,
when that construction leads to conclusions contrary to the intent of the
agency that implemented the regulation,57 or if "such plain meaning would
,,58lead to absurd results. Under this exception, "the intent of Congress or
the Agency concerning the disputed language must be resolved through
application of various settled rules of construction and interpretation,
including analysis of the underlying statute's structure and purpose." 59
C. The Administrative Procedure Act
Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") with
the purpose to "insure uniformity, impartiality, and fairness in the
procedures employed by federal administrative agencies." 60 The notice
provisions of the APA contribute to the fairness purpose by requiring each
agency to publish specific rules, statements, descriptions, and revisions
with the Federal Register for "guidance of the public." 61 The publication
56 40 C.F.R. § 51.105 (2006).
5 American Alternative Ins. Co. v. Sentry Select Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 550, 554-55
(E.D.Va. 2001); Riverkeeper, 2007 WL 184658 at *24.
5 Dyer v. United States, 832 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1987).
59 American Alternative, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 555.
60 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 14 (2007).
61 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register
for the guidance of the public-
(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the established places at
which, the employees (and in the case of a uniformed service, the members)
from whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain information, make
submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal
and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all
papers, reports, or examinations;
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required by this section of the APA "had as its principal purpose that there
was to be disclosure to the public of the manner in which the Government
conducts its business. Congress additionally was concerned with the
dilemma in which the public finds itself when forced to 'liti ate with
agencies on the basis of secret laws or incomplete information."'
The APA also requires notice of any proposed rule making by
federal agencies.63 When proposing a rule, agencies must give notice of
any rulemaking proceedings, legal authority, and the substance of the rule
by publication in the Federal Register.6 However, the same section
specifically provides for several exceptions for publication of notice
including any rules deemed merely interpretive rather than substantive.
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and
statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability
formulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms
thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely
affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so
published. For the purpose of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the
class of persons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register
when incorporated by reference therein with the approval of the Director of the
Federal Register.
Id.
62 Weisburg v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
6 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000).
6 Id.
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served
or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall
include--
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved...
Id.65id.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply--
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice; or
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The distinction between interpretive rules and substantive rules is difficult
to discern. 66 The Ninth Circuit has defined interpretive rules as "those
which merely clarify or explain existing laws or regulations. They are
'essentially hortatory and instructional,' reflecting the administrator's
thinking 'in particular, narrowly defined, situations."' 67 In contrast are
substantive rules, which the Ninth Circuit has defined "to include those
[rules] that work a change in extant law or policy. Substantive rules are
said to create law incrementally, pursuant to authority properly delegated
by Congress."6 The purpose of this exception is to permit agencies to
explain themselves without going through extensive and time-consuming
proceedings. 69 The application of the interpretive and substantive
definitions in determining whether a rule falls within the interpretive rule
exception is largely specific to the facts of the case, and courts are likely
afforded a substantial amount of discretion. 70
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Judge Berzon delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Judges
Alarcon and Rymer. 7 1 The opinion began by looking at the plain meaning
of Idaho's 2003 SIP to determine if the regulation prohibited field burning
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a
brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.
Id.
6 Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984).
67 Flagstaff Medical Center, Inc. v. Sullivan, 962 F.2d 879, 886 (9th Cir. 1992). Another
Ninth Circuit case similarly states, "In general terms, interpretive rules merely explain,
but do not add to, the substantive law that already exists in the form of a statute or
legislative rule." Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 333 F.2d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003); see
also, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 2006). The
United State Supreme Court held that interpretive rules are "issued by an agency to
advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it
administers." Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 88 (1995).
6 Flagstaff, 962 F.2d at 886.




71 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1098.
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on its face. 7 2 The court found that the "SIP mandated that '[n]o person
shall allow, suffer, cause or permit any open burning operation unless it is
a category of open burning set forth' in ten specified sections that
'establish categories of open burning that are allowed when done
according to the prescribed conditions.' 73 The court then concluded that
field burning did not fit into any of the ten open burning exceptions.74
Because the SIP did not fit into any of these exceptions, the court found
that there was no question as to whether the broad prohibition on open
burning applied to field burning. 75
Next, the court noted that the interpretation and analysis of the SIP
would proceed no further, because when interpreting a SIP, the court
"look[s] toward the 'plain meaning of the plan and stop[s] there if the
language is clear."76 The opinion cited several cases where other Ninth
Circuit appellate panels and District Courts similarly adopted the
preceding rule, and applied the same methodology used in those
examples.77 The court concluded that the Idaho SIP did not facially permit
field burning.7 8
The court's subsequent analysis turned to whether interpretation of
a regulation based on intent or general understanding would overcome the
plain meaning of the SIP that the court found controlling in the preceding
analysis. 79 The court began by looking at an analogous case where the
Supreme Court interpreted a SIP under the Clean Water Act. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the act incorporated state standards for
72 Id at 1103.
7 Id.
74 Id The ten categories that serve as exceptions to the ban on open burning are:
"'Recreational and Warming Fires'; 'Weed Control Fires' for 'abatement along fence
lines, canal banks, and ditch banks'; 'Training Fires' for firefighting training; 'Industrial
Fares'; 'Residential Solid Waste Disposal Fires'; 'Landfill Disposal Site Fires'; 'Orchard
Fires'; 'Prescribed Burning' for fire management purposes; 'Dangerous Material Fires';
and 'Infectious Waste Burning."' Id The ten categories are incorporated into the Idaho
Administrative Code. Idaho Admin. Code r. 58.01.01.606 et seq. (2007).
" SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1103.
76id
n Id at 1103-04.
7 8 Id. at 1104.
80 id
564
NARROWING THE EXCEPTION TO SIP INTERPRETATION
water quality, and such standards, approved by the EPA, become a part of
federal law. * Because the SIP has "the force and effect of federal law,"82
the court noted that the "state may not unilaterally alter the plan" or make
any changes without approval of the EPA. Therefore, the court
concluded that even though a state may explicitly incorporate its
interpretation of a SIP into state law, that inte Tretation is not necessarily
applicable to the SIP as a matter of federal law.
Next, the Ninth Circuit turned to the plain meaning of the SIP, and
noted that as an exception, such meaning or interpretation will not control
in a circumstance where "administrative intent is to the contrary" or "such
plain meaning would lead to absurd results."85 The court admitted that
there was no guidance on how agencies or legislatures should express
intent, but concluded that under the APA, published notices accompanying
the rulemaking process must reference at least some regulatory intent in
order to overcome the plain language meaning of a SIP. 86 The court's
reasoning was that without notice published in the Federal Register,
interested or concerned parties would have no way of knowing important
details of proposed regulations, nor would they have any opportunity to
comment on such proposals.87 In light of this reasoning, the court found
that parties, who would normally comment on, or contest a regulation,
might fail to do so in the requisite time allotted by the CAA,88 because
they would not have notice of the unpublished intent and would ultimately
assume the plain meaning of the regulation controls. 89 Thus, the court did
not find any administrative intent clearly and expressly contrary to the
81 Id. (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992).
82 Trs. For Alaska v. Fink, 17 F.3d 1209, 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Union Elec. Co.
v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 211 (8th Cir. 1975), af'd, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)).
83 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1105.
8 Id.
8s Id. (citing Dyer v. United States, 832 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1987)). The court
notes that the actual language of the exception is "legislative intent to the contrary," but
the court uses "administrative intent" based on the analysis in Dyer and for clarity.
SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1105 n.7.
86 Id. at 1105. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1) & 553(b) (2000).
" SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1106.8 8 The CAA requires that any judicial challenges to a SIP must be filed within 60 days of
EPA approval. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000).
8 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1106.
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plain meaning of the SIP, because the EPA did not publish or give notice
of Idaho's intent to continue allowing open field burning during the
rulemaking period leading up to the approval of Idaho's SIP.9
The court then examined whether the plain meaning of the SIP
would lead to absurd results, and concluded in the negative based on two
arguments. 9' First, since the administrative record showed that field
burning creates many air quality and health problems, the court found that
it would not be difficult to conclude that Idaho may wish to take steps to
ban field burning under the CAA in order to reduce the pollution that
causes these problems. 92 Second, because the neighboring state of
Washington has effectively banned open burning of fields, it would not be
absurd to conclude that Idaho sought to follow the lead of its sister state.93
Therefore, the court found that the "plain language is not absurd at all,
much less sufficiently absurd to justify departure from a plain words
interpretation." 94
Finally, the court addressed two arguments first raised by the EPA
on appeal.9 5 The EPA's first point was federal courts have prohibited the
EPA from independently making a SIP more strict than originally
proposed by the state submitting the plan. 96 The court distinguished this
argument by pointing out the decisions cited by the EPA all involved the
interpretation of CAA provisions to determine if the EPA had authority to
90 Id. The court noted that that "Idaho lawmakers and regulators made their intentions
toward field burning know through more formal actions, such as enacting legislation and
regulations allowing field burning, none of these measures were referenced in the
gublished materials that accompanied adoption of the earlier SIPs." Id. at 1107.Id.
92 Id See supra notes 6-8.
9 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1107. "The Washington Clean Air Act prohibits open burning of
field and turf grasses grown for seed whenever ecology has concluded, through a process
spelled out in the act, that any procedure, program, technique, or device constitutes a
practical alternate agricultural practice to open burning, and that alternate is reasonably
available." Wash. Admin. Code 173-430-045(1) (2007).
94 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1107.
95Id.
I. at 1107-08. The court cites several federal cases to support this contention. See
Riverside Cement Co. v. Thomas, 843 F.2d 1246, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1988); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 1984); Train v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975); Hall v. EPA, 273 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001).
566
NARROWING THE EXCEPTION TO SIP INTERPRETATION
"approve or deny SIPs." 97 The court found that, because the present matter
dealt with the interpretation of SIP language originally drafted by the state,
the court would not extend the cited cases to support the EPA's
assertion.98 Next, the court entertained the EPA's second argument that a
plain meaning interpretation would violate the rule "prohibiting the EPA
from approving SIPs based on 'an elusive and illusory measure."' 99 In
other words, the Ninth Circuit prohibits the EPA from approving a SIP
that is perhaps indefinite or contingent, because there is a chance that the
SIP may never become an effective regulation.t00 Once again, the court
disagreed with the EPA's reasoning because it found the plan submitted
by Idaho to be anything but illusory.10 In fact, the court noted that the
case cited by the EPA instead supported the opinion of the court, because
the court in that case also looked at the plain language of a SIP to
determine if it was illusory, indefinite, or contingent.' 02 Because the court
rejected the two preceding arguments by the EPA and held that the plain
meaning of the Idaho SIP clearly 0 3 prohibited field burning by failing to
provide an exception to a broad prohibition, then Idaho's SIPs prior to
2005 effectively banned field burning under federal law as adopted by the
EPA.
V. COMMENT
The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the language in the
preexisting Idaho SIP banned field burning because the plain meaning of
the regulation was "apparent, not absurd, and not contradicted by the
manifest intent of the EPA, as expressed in the promulgating documents
" SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1108.
98id
9 Id. (citing Riverside Cement, 843 F.2d at 1248).
' SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1108.
101 Id.
102 Id. See Riverside Cement, 843 F.2d at 1248.
103 An SIP is clear when its "meaning is apparent, not absurd, and not contradicted by the
manifest intent of EPA, as expressed in the promulgating documents available to the
public." SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1108.
Id.
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available to the public."' 05 This holding is clear, rational, and supported
by precedent, but this note disagrees with the court's statement that the
EPA must express its intent in publicly available documents. The court in
the instant case failed to properly analyze a well-established exception to
the "plain meaning" interpretation rule to reach its ultimate holding. In
1980, the United States Supreme Court stated, "the familiar canon of
statutory construction [is] that the starting point for interpreting a statute is
the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive."l 06 Extending this rule to apply to the administrative intent of
the EPA, 07 the court in SAFE presumed without basis that the notice
requirements of the APA were necessary to show such intent.108 The APA
essentially requires the EPA to publish any adopted substantive rules,
interpretations, or general policy statements, and any proposed rule
making in the Federal Register for purposes of guiding the public.109 By
failing to publish in the Federal Register, the court found that the EPA did
not clearly express its administrative intent"i0 and thus the exception to the
"plain meaning" interpretation rule would not apply."' The court's
presumption is erroneous for two reasons.
First, the court argues that the notice requirements of the APA are
essential to show regulatory intent so that any interested parties can have
an opportunity to comment on proposed regulations.112 The court reasoned
that because the 1993 Idaho SIP appeared to disallow field burning on its
face, notice publication by the EPA within the Federal Register is the only
means for interested parties to have an opportunity to comment on
proposed regulations where intent is contrary to the plain meaning of the
105 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1108.
1o6 Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)
(emphasis added); Dyer v. U.S., 832 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir 1987).
107 See supra note 71.
10 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1105-06.
109 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1), 553(b) (2000).
no SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1106.
' Id. at 1107.
112 Id. In the proposed rulemaking process, notice is sufficient if it gives interested
parties "a meaningful opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions." Hall v. EPA,
273 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001).
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regulation.113 However, publication of notice for comment purposes was
unnecessary in this case because any interested parties could have simply
referenced the Idaho Code to realize that Idaho clearly intended to keep
field burning legal.1 4 Moreover, any interested parties wishing to
comment on the Idaho's SIP would likely have been aware that growers
continued to burn fields for over a decade.It5 Therefore, it would be
redundant to require the EPA to publish the intent of the Idaho SIP in the
Federal Register to keep field burning legal, when statute and practice
within the state both indicate Idaho's intent.
It is important to note that this argument does not assert that
interested parties should not have the opportunity to exercise their "right
to participate in the rulemaking process." 16 Moreover, there is no dispute
that the opportunity to comment on proposed regulations applies to SIP
revisions. Rather, the issue is the form by which Idaho or the EPA may
show regulatory intent in order to rebut the plain language of Idaho's SIP.
The court openly admits that the form of intent is an issue that the court
has yet to address.' As shown above, Idaho's intent to keep field burning
legal came in the form of continued practice and statutes sufficient to give
any interested parties notice of such intent.119 The instant court cited no
authority to support the argument that notice of intent on the level
prescribed by the APA is required to rebut the plain language of Idaho's
SIP. Therefore, the need for interested parties to have the opportunity to
comment on the SIP revision is an insufficient reason to require the
l1 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1106.
11 4 Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 35.
" Id. "State regulators, grass growers, and environmental groups participated in
discussions that let to voluntary smoke management plans and similar agreements in
Idaho. In addition, EPA, ISDA [Idaho Department of Agriculture], IDEQ [Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality], and Indian tribes entered into memoranda of
understanding in which the parties pledged to share information and work together to
manage smoke from agricultural burning in the region. Moreover, ISDA and IDEQ
produced annual reports that summarized the bum season and discussed issues, solutions
and recommendations. Moreover, the applicable state statute specifically authorized
certain agricultural burning." Id. (citations omitted).
116 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1106.
117 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1106; Ober v. EPA, 84 F.3d 304, 312.
"' SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1105.
119 See supra notes 100-01.
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application of APA notice requirements to this exception to the plain
language rule.
Second, when courts examine the plain language of SIP regulations
that are contrary to the intent behind the regulation, courts are more likely
to find evidence of such intent in the policies and practices of the state
government, rather than the EPA. In the instant case, Idaho governmental
agencies, with the approval of the Idaho Legislature, conceptualized,
developed, and drafted the SIP before submitting it to the EPA for
approval.120 This process "is described as an 'experiment in federalism"
because states have a role in the creation of federal environmental
policies. 12 Even though the policies found in a SIP are federal policies,
they originate from the state; therefore, any intent behind Idaho's SIP
regulation would have its source from within the Idaho government.122
Moreover, courts have held that "a federal agency should defer to a state's
interpretation of the terms of its air pollution control plan when such
interpretation is consistent with the Clean Air Act."123 This is exactly what
the EPA did when it approved Idaho's SIP clarification.124 Knowing that
the state continuously and consistently permitted field burning under
statutes and regulations, the EPA interpreted Idaho's SIP based on the
Idaho government's apparent intent to allow field burning.125 Therefore, it
was irrational for the Ninth Circuit to look to the EPA to determine
120 Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 6. "Since at least 1970, IDEQ or its predecessor
agency, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("IDHW"), have, subject to any
limitations on their authority under state law, issued Rules and Regulations for the
Control of Air Pollution in Idaho." Id. at 6-7.
121 Scott Josephson, This Dog Has Teeth... Cooperative Federalism and Environmental
Law, 16 VIL. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 109 (2005).122 d
123 U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 755 F. Supp. 720, 722 (N.D.Tex. 1991) (citing
Florida Power and Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579, 588 (5th Cir. 1981)). See also U.S.
v. Interlake, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 985, 987 (N.D. Ill. 1977). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals "ordinarily grants substantial deference to such interpretations. If an agency's
interpretation is a reasoned and consistent view of its regulations, we will not substitute
our own interpretation for that of the agency's." (deference would have been granted to
IDEQ, but for the inconsistent interpretation the agency made in this particular case).
The instant case is distinguished from this case in that the IDEQ interpretation of Idaho's
SIP is not inconsistent or unreasonable in light of the CAA.
124 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 15.12 5 Id., Idaho Code § 22-4801.
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whether it had sufficiently expressed the intent behind Idaho's SIP in
accordance with the APA. Instead, the Court should have gone directly to
the source, the Idaho government, to seek out the true intent behind the
SIP. The APA clearly exempts "the governments of the territories or
possessions of the United States" from compliance with notice
provisions.126 Thus, under this view, the state drafting agencies of the
Idaho SIP would not need to comply with the APA.
Assuming arguendo that the notice provisions of the APA are
necessary to show the EPA's administrative intent contrary to the plain
meaning of a SIP, those provisions still would not require published notice
in the Federal Register or otherwise as the instant court suggests.127 The
court cites two statutes to support its contention, 128 but neither applies to
the facts of the instant matter. The first statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1),
requires publication of adopted rules, but has been interpreted "to provide
a shield for a petitioner before an agency... It is not a sword by which a
petitioner can strike down the agency's order on the ground that the
agency has not authorized itself to issue that type of order, by publishing a
statement in the Federal Register."l29 However, in the instant case, the
court uses the statute as a sword to attack the EPA's failure to publish
notice of intent to allow field burning in Idaho. The second statute, 5
U.S.C. § 553(b), requires publication of proposed rulemaking, but "does
not apply.. .to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice."' 30 The EPA's approval of
126 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(C) (2000).
127 SAFE, 475 F.3d at 1107.
128Id. at 1105 n.8. See supra note 72.
129 T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 186 F. Supp. 777, 786 (S.D. Tex. 1960), aff'd
366 U.S. 419. Note that 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(1) replaced 5 U.S.C. § 1002, the statute
reviewed by the court in T.S. C. Motor Freight Lines. Pasco, Inc. v. Federal Energy
Admin., 525 F.2d 1391, 1405 (Em. App. 1975).
130 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). See, e.g., Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844
(D.C. Cir 1979) (EPA passed a regulation that incorporated statutory changes to the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration standards of the Clean Air Act into its
regulations. The court found the regulation to be interpretive and not subject to notice
and comment procedures); General Motors v. Ruckelshaus 742 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (The EPA passed a rule to correct nonconformities with the CAA, justified only by
statutory interpretation. The court found that the notice and comment procedures of the
APA did not apply because the rule did not create any new rights or duties, but simply
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the SIP was merely an interpretive clarification of existin law that field
burning was an allowable category of open burning. Furthermore,
courts should defer to agency intention that a revision is a mere
clarification rather than a substantive change to the law.132 The
clarification did not change the permissibility of field burning, which
growers in Idaho have continued to practice, and the Idaho Code has
continued to authorize.' 33 Therefore, without any substantive change to
the force and effect of the EPA regulation clarifying Idaho's SIP, the rule
is nothing but interpretive and outside the scope of the publishing and
notice requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).1 34
The instant court's application of the APA supported the ultimate
holding, but it has a weak foundation in precedent, logic, or common
sense. In addition, the opinion failed to consider the practical
consequences of applying the act, which had the ultimate effect of an
unsubstantiated analysis by the court.135 Had the court formed a stronger
basis for its opinion, its ruling may have been more consistent with the
prevailing law on this subject.
restated the agency's consistent practice in conducting recalls); United States v. Economy
Muffler & Tire Ctr., Inc. 762 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D. Va. 1991) (The EPA issued a notice to
clarify Congressional intent in the CAA instead of adding substantive content). See also,
126 A.L.R. Fed. 347 (1995).
13' Brief of Respondent, supra note 2, at 42. See supra, note 67.
132 First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.
1999). "If the agency expressly communicates that its intention in issuing the regulation
was to clarify rather than change existing law, courts should defer to such announcements
unless the revisions are in plain conflict with earlier interpretations." Id.
u1 Idaho Code § 22-4801.
134 The court in Ober v. EPA, held that 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) applies to SIP revisions, but
the instant case is distinguished from this because the revisions in that case made
substantive changes to the EPA regulations. 84 F.3d 304, 312 (9th Cir. 1996).
Therefore, the case does not fall under the interpretive rule exception.
135 Solis v. Saenz, 60 Fed. Appx. 117, 119 (9th Cir. 2003). "We examine the language of
the regulation by looking to provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy. We
also take into account common sense, the regulatory purpose, and the practical
consequences of the proposed interpretation." Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The instant court's decision to remand the approval of the Idaho
SIP revision back to the EPA was the most reasonable conclusion for the
court. As shown above, the use of the APA notice procedures as a means
to determine whether the intent of the Idaho SIP clearly contradicts the
plain language is without foundation. Moreover, the court's holding
severely limits the intent exception to the plain meaning interpretation
rule. Without this limitation, the court still probably would have concluded
that Idaho's intent was not sufficient to overcome the plain meaning of the
SIP. Therefore, the application of the APA was unnecessary for the court
to conclude that field burning in Idaho was illegal. Regardless, the
important thing to remember here is this case simply sent the regulation
back to the EPA for review, rather than invalidating the SIP revision
altogether. There is still a significant chance that the EPA will approve the
modification of the Idaho SIP once again, but with better reasoning. This
case unfortunately focuses so much on regulatory technicalities, and
effectively permitted the words in Idaho's SIP to speak louder than the
actions of Idaho grass farmers and the state legislature.
RYAN WESTHOFF
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